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This article focuses on the recognition of foreign marriages and personal statuses as part of 
family reunification proceedings under EU Family Reunification Directive. The central focus 
of the article is the principle of not recognising polygamous marriages as grounds for the right 
to family reunification. The article briefly examines the historical negative approaches to 
recognising polygamous marriages in the Western Migration Law as well as Private 
International Law and accordingly, the interconnection between the present rule under EU 
Migration Law and the previous case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The author 
then introduces the EU policy reasons for taking a stand against these marriages. The 
perspective of the policy aim is then critically evaluated. The critical part methodologically 
employs a critical feminist theory, focusing on the structure of the present rule and the  power-
relations it presupposes and re-creates in the relationships subject to it. The article concludes 
that, albeit it is claimed that the present European policy of non-recognition of polygamous 
marriages as grounds for family reunification is aimed at the protection of women’s rights and 
equality between sexes, the consequences of the rule application support the paradigm of 
taking all the decisive power over the relationship away from women and granting it to men. 
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Recognition of a marriage, in the sense of admitting effects in the forum state1  to relationships and 
personal statuses acquired abroad is a process developed within the field of Private International Law 
(PIL). Presently, the leading principle for recognition of marriages under European national PIL rules 
is the rule of the celebration of marriage (lex loci celebrationis),2 which states that a marriage is valid 
if it is conducted in accordance with the form required by the law of the country where it was 
celebrated. Under current practice, the parties applying for recognition of marriage have to present 
documentation fulfilling international standards (i.e. including verification either with an apostille or 
legalisation) proving that their marriage has been concluded. After receiving the applicable 
documentation, the forum state assesses the formal and substantial requirements of the marriage. In 
the end, the forum state recognises and registers the marriage in its civil register. However, it also has 
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the right to refuse to recognise a foreign marriage, should the parties fail to present the formal 
documentation or should this marriage interfere with the public order of the state.3  
The process of recognition of marriage can be applied either in a general context of cross-
border relationships (loosely connected to migration) or as an immanent part of migratory 
proceedings in the strict sense. The first type of case concerns recognition of a foreign marriage 
for other than migratory purposes, or recognition occurring after obtaining a residence permit 
in the forum state as a consequence of previous migration to the forum state. Such framework 
covers situations when a wife living abroad claims the pension of a deceased husband living 
in the forum state, or when a married couple relocates together and both persons can claim 
their own legal grounds for relocation (e.g. both can apply for asylum protection), but they 
wish to be treated as a married couple in and after the migratory proceedings. These situations 
are regulated by the rules of Private International Law. The approaches of the national states 
to recognising marriages in this context remain unharmonized at the EU level. 
The second type of case, which is central to this article, mainly concerns people applying for 
the right to reside in the forum state on the basis of their existent marriage; because existence 
of a marriage between them can establish a right to family reunification. However, before the 
right is granted to the applicant, the forum state needs to verify if a family relationship really 
exists between the applicant and the sponsor. In cases of claimed matrimonial relationships 
between applicants and sponsors, the existence of a marriage needs to be proved and 
recognised. Accordingly, in practice the claimed marriage and its form need to correspond or 
be relatable to the normative aspects of marriage according to the forum state’s legal order, 
which is the reason why polygamous marriages are usually not recognised – or not recognised 
to their full extent. The provisions of Western forum states’ substantive law only allow 
monogamous marriages and thus prohibit the recognition of polygamous marriage in their 
Migration Law. This legal prohibition serves to protect the public order in the forum state.4 
The claimed existence of a marriage thus presents an incidental question for granting the right 
to reunify with one’s family. As recognition in this context is a part of the migratory process 
in the strict sense, the rules regulating it belong in the frame of Migration Law. The approach 
of EU states towards applicants from third countries applying for family reunification is 
harmonised on the EU level through the EU Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 
2003 on the right to family reunification (Family Reunification Directive).5 
It is crucial to distinguish between these two frameworks under which recognition of foreign 
marriage is applied: not only because both of the regulatory areas have different reasons for 
existence and the doctrinal roots of the instruments they employ are not entirely shared, but 
also because, in practical terms of law application and adjudication in the forum state, they are 
independent of each other (court decisions in Migration Law context might not present res 
iudicata in the PIL context, etc.). Each field might even employ a different regulation of 
normative requirements for marriage.6 
Applicants relocating to Western European states from countries governed by Islamic Law 
can thus encounter various obstacles to recognition of their marriages for family reunification 
purposes. Even the first step as described above is often problematic, as getting hold of the 
right documentation might be impossible for subjects freshly arrived in the forum state (for 
example in the cases of refugees from unstable countries).7 Additionally, in many European 
countries, some forms of marriages associated with customary application of traditional 
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Islamic Law, e.g. polygamous marriages, allegedly represent a threat to the national public 
order, which is why most of these countries hesitate to recognise their validity and tend to 
activate the public order reservation. The EU Family Reunification Directive correspondingly 
provides a rule that disqualifies recognition of polygamous marriage in its full extent for the 
purpose of family reunification. 
Further in this article, the author will introduce the teleology behind the EU legislative 
approach to recognition of polygamous marriages under the Family Reunification Directive. 
The history of this approach will be accordingly outlined through the sources of the intellectual 
origins of the idea that foreign marriages can have effect in a forum state as well as through 
examples of historical migration law-making. The article will then describe the major shift in 
the relevant values legitimising the non-recognition of polygamy for family reunification 
purpose, from Christian values to human rights values. Eventually, the article will pay central 
attention to the human rights values that justify this approach under the current law. In the end 
the values acting as objectives of the present EU reunification policy will be critically evaluated 
with a focus on the normative disposition and the structure of the rule; and the corresponding 
paradigm that the current rule is based on. 
 
 
History of Recognising Polygamous Marriages under the Common European 
Framework 
 
European national states have not historically encountered polygamous marriages on a 
massive scale but rather occasionally. Accordingly, polygamous marriages do not present a 
frequently practiced form of matrimonial union in the countries governed under Islamic Law 
nowadays.8 The negative responses of national courts to polygamous marriages in the first half 
of the 20th century corresponded with typically superior colonial approaches to the colonialised 
countries’ cultures to the extent that they did not comply with Christian values.9 In that period, 
regulation of polygamous marriages in countries without a stronger colonial outreach, e.g. in 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was accordingly restrictive for the reason of superiority of 
Christian morality10 but also potentially as a legacy of historically conflicting relation to the 
Ottoman empire.11 
The general idea that foreign marriage can have effectivity admitted in the forum state 
doctrinally originates from the field of Private International Law. The roots of this idea and 
one of the oldest documented terms under which this effectivity in the forum state was admitted 
go back to the Early Middle Ages.12 Notably, in its modern history, the Western doctrine of 
recognition of marriages under the field of PIL was marked by its negative approach to 
recognising polygamous marriages, precisely for its ‘immorality’ based on its non-compliance 
with Christian values.13 The same approach was adopted in the late 19th century regulatory 
framework for family reunification under the then emerging field of Migration Law, where the 
protected family unity was married and monogamous.14 At the turn of the 20th century, 
participation on a polygamous marriage even served as a criterion disqualifying a person from 
migrating into the United States in general.15 
This part does not aim to exhaustively map the doctrinal history of marriage recognition 
under PIL or under Migration Law, but merely serves to outline the possible historical attitudes 
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at the grassroots of the present migratory rules on non-recognition of polygamous marriages 
under the EU Directive. The pinpoints from doctrinal history of PIL or Migration Law show 
that the approach of Western lawmakers and some scholars towards recognising polygamous 
marriages has traditionally been negative.  
 The institution of family reunification and the European understanding of the protection 
of family ties in a migratory context was dynamically developed in the period after the Second 
World War. The emergence of the modern system of international human rights addressed the 
phenomenon of international migration by granting fundamental rights on the international 
level to everyone without distinction on the basis of nationality, thus also to migrants.16 The 
protection of the family was enacted as a fundamental right by various international and 
European treaties –  the right to protection of the family under Art. 16 of Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948) or the right to respect for private and family life under Art. 8 of 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR 
or the Convention). The fact that even non-nationals affected by the Convention party states 
could claim the protection of their family began a long and ongoing process of interpretation 
of the notion of family and its different cultural connotations under the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court). The scope of lawful interference with 
the right under conditions of Art. 8(2) of the Convention17 also immediately became subject to 
evolving interpretations. 
 Some of the subjects in polygamous marriages felt that their second wives or their 
children from the second marriage should have received the right to reunify with them as 
family members in the forum state and that the state violated their rights under Art. 8 of ECHR 
in denying reunification of these family members. As a result, the recognition of polygamous 
marriage as a pre-requisite for family reunification was addressed by the European Court of 
Human Rights in three cases during the 1980s and 1990s: of E.A. and A.A. v. the Netherlands 
(No. 14501/89)18, M. and O.M. v. the Netherlands (No. 12139/86)19 and Bibi v. the United 
Kingdom (No. 19628/92)20. In the following paragraphs, the article shall briefly introduce 
these cases. 
 In the case of E.A. and A.A. v. the Netherlands the applicants were a father, who moved 
to the Netherlands from Morocco, and his elder son, who grew up in Morocco. The father re-
married in the Netherlands with a Moroccan woman who had permanent residence there and 
he was authorized to stay in the Netherlands on the basis of this marriage, i.e. on the grounds 
of family reunification with this new wife. Later he was granted a permanent residence permit. 
He kept on visiting his first marriage family in Morocco regularly and provided for their 
maintenance. The parents agreed that their elder son (at the age of 13) would move to the 
Netherlands to stay there with his father. The Dutch authorities repeatedly rejected the father’s 
applications for a residence permit for his son based on family reunification grounds because 
of the Dutch policy regarding family reunification of bigamous aliens allowing authorisation 
of reunification only for one spouse of the husband and the children born of their relationship.  
According to the decision of the Deputy Minister of Justice in an appeal submitted by the 
applicant, polygamy was considered contrary to the Dutch public order. All national 
administrative and judicial instances deciding in the case, confirmed this decision as a justified 
interference with the applicant’s right under Art. 8 ECHR. Consequently, the applicant turned 
to the Court claiming that his rights under Art. 8 ECHR were violated without meeting the 
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criteria under Art. 8(2) ECHR. The decision on the admissibility of this case to the Court was 
made by a former body of this Court – The Commission of Human Rights (the Commission). 
The Commission based its decision on the inadmissibility of the claim on the doctrine of 
margin of appreciation and emphasised the close connection between the control over 
immigration and consideration of public order. The legitimate interest pursued by the 
Netherlands in this case was the measure of immigration control. 
 The second case of M. and O.M. v. the Netherlands was built on similar factual 
circumstances. The applicant from Morocco moved to the Netherlands where he concluded a 
second marriage. His son, the second applicant, came to the Netherlands to join him at the age 
of 19. Following the relocation of the son, the father divorced his first wife (still living in 
Morocco) and was granted legal custody over the son. The Head of Police in the Netherlands 
refused to grant the son a residence permit, because he was born of a second marriage of his 
father (other marriage than the marriage registered in the Netherlands). The applicant turned 
to the Court, claiming that his rights under Art. 8 and Art. 14 ECHR (prohibition of 
discrimination) had been violated without meeting the criteria under Art. 8(2) ECHR. The 
Commission found this claim inadmissible on the basis of Art. 8 ECHR because the son was 
too old to claim the right of reunification and there was no financial dependency between the 
two. It also found inadmissibility on the basis of Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 8 ECHR 
because the government followed its legitimate interest in controlling the entry of immigrants 
while interfering with the applicant’s rights under Art. 8 ECHR. The Commission concluded 
that when considering application for family reunification, the state cannot be required under 
the Convention to give full recognition to polygamous marriages as those are considered to be 
in conflict with its public order. The policy in the Netherlands regarding family reunification 
provided that the husband is only ‘allowed to  bring with him one of his wives, according to 
his own choice, and the children of that wife’21. 
 The last case of Bibi v. United Kingdom concerned an application of a girl born in 
Bangladesh, whose father migrated to the UK from Bangladesh and became a UK citizen 
before she was born. He returned to Bangladesh and married the applicant’s mother, after 
which the applicant was born. The father consequently married a second wife, also a 
Bangladeshi citizen, who joined him in the UK. The applicant (aged 9) and her sister were 
allowed to reunify with the father in the UK on the basis of DNA tests of paternity. The mother 
applied to enter the UK when the applicant was aged 10. Her application was refused as the 
UK law only allowed non-citizen wives and minor children, without the right of abode in the 
UK, to enter if the husband/father could accommodate them; at the same time, only one wife 
could be permitted. The British Immigration Act 1988 provided that a woman cannot be 
granted a residence permit on the basis of a polygamous marriage if another woman has already 
been admitted as the wife of the same husband.  
According to the Commission’s summary of the case, the aim of the British Parliament in 
enacting this law was to prevent the formation of polygamous households as the practice of 
polygamy was unacceptable to the vast majority of people in the UK. The applicant claimed 
that her right under Art. 8 ECHR had been breached and that her mother had been discriminated 
against on the basis of sex, as the law allows the husband to choose which wife will join him 
in the UK. The Commission stated that the interference with the applicant’s rights was in 
accordance with the law. The aim of the law was according to the Commission’s reading to 
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‘preserve the Christianity-based monogamous culture dominant in the UK’. This objective, 
under the assessment of the Commission, fell into the scope of Art. 8(2) ECHR and was found 
necessary in a democratic society. The Commission stated that the alleged discriminatory 
nature of the British law flowed essentially from the nature of the practice of polygamy. The 
application was found inadmissible. 
 The Court through these three cases contributed to defining the human rights limits of 
the rule of non-recognition of polygamous marriages for family reunification. The Court in the 
aforementioned cases approved the rule that an alien in a polygamous marriage can only bring 
one of his spouses to the forum state on the basis of family reunification, while the claims of 
additional spouses will be denied. This legal paradigm, which potentially interferes with 
individual rights under Art. 8 ECHR, was justified by the doctrine of margin of appreciation 
(one of the interpretative mechanisms of the Court) and the principle of state sovereignty in 
immigration matters. The Court also articulated that the legal interest in the ‘preservation of 
Christian based monogamous culture’ presents a legitimate aim justifying interference with the 
applicants’ rights under Art. 8 ECHR.22 Through the cases the Court noted that there is no right 
to enter or reside in a particular country guaranteed under the Convention.23 
 When the EU Council adopted the Family Reunification Directive, it paid due respect to 
the interpretation of the notion of family life under ECtHR case-law.24 Even though the ECtHR 
was hesitant to establish a right to residence in a particular state on the basis of family ties, the 
Family Reunification Directive in its Art. 1 operates with the term right to family reunification, 
i.e. it suggests that the right to residence in a particular state might exist if a close (enumerated) 
relative is residing there. It also states that this right is to be exercised in compliance with 
values recognised in the member states which justifies a possible negative approach to family 
reunification of polygamous households.25 In its Chapter II, Art. 4(4), the Directive 
substantially mimics the provisions of Dutch and British immigration laws previously 
approved by the ECtHR and stipulates that where the sponsor already has a spouse living with 
him in the territory of a member state, the member state concerned shall not authorise the 
family reunification of a further spouse. Accordingly, member states may limit the family 
reunification of minor children of a further spouse and the sponsor. 
 
 
 Teleology of Non-Recognition of Polygamous Marriages as a Ground for Family 
Reunification 
 
As documented earlier in the text, the historical reasons for not recognising the effectivity of 
polygamous marriages in the forum state were based on the conviction that Christian ideals are 
morally superior to those of other religions, which was especially explicit, but not limited, in 
relation to cultures under colonial control. It is interesting to observe that monogamy has 
maintained its unwavering stability protected by law or even under the scope of public order, 
when the prevalence of the Christian ideal of marriage has to a large extent already been 
overcome by easing the regulations for divorce or by the Western European trend of legalising 
homosexual marriages. As apparent from the argumentation of the ECtHR in the three cases 
of recognition of polygamous marriages, the notion of state sovereignty and the right of the 
state to select the people admitted to reside in its territory as well as the protection of Christian 
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values present legitimate interests falling into the scope of the public order, preventing states 
from recognising these marriages and admitting their effect in Migration Law. 
The argumentation of the ECtHR in favour of the rejection of recognition of polygamous 
marriages is thus reflecting the general Western trend of the 20th century, where the importance 
of Christian values has been tempered by the rise of the importance of secular and humanistic 
values. Accordingly, the Commission through the cases articulated several reasons supporting 
the non-recognition of polygamous marriages where the mix of these reasons combines 
explicitly Christian references with general sovereignty- or cohesive society-based reasons. 
The legislative and policy discourse before and after the adoption of the Family Reunification 
Directive fully allies with the trend of the softening of explicit considerations for Christian 
values, as the argumentation for adopting a restrictive approach towards polygamous marriages 
as grounds for family reunification has been largely based on the aim of protection of human 
rights, in particular protection of women and respect for gender equality.  
It appears that member states were against admitting family reunification effects to 
polygamous marriages on the basis of protection of domestic public order and on the basis of 
general refusal of the concept of polygamous unions in the host society.26 The Directive 
however offers a general rule to reject application for family reunification on the grounds of 
public order in its Article 6(1) and (2), which demonstrates that rejection of polygamous 
marriages presents a special reason of public order as it is specifically articulated as its own 
ground for rejection. In the succeeding guidelines on the application of the Directive, the 
European Commission proclaimed that the public order reasons of the member states for non-
recognising polygamous marriages insisted in the effort to prevent forced marriages.27 In 
accordance with the preparatory and implementing guiding documents, the preamble of the 
Directive states that: ‘The right to family reunification should be exercised in proper 
compliance […] with respect to the rights of women and of children; such compliance justifies 
the possible taking of restrictive measures against applications for family reunification of 
polygamous households’.28  Based on these sources, it is thus reasonable to imply that together 
with general public order reasons, the aims of states to combat forced marriages and enhance 
protection of women have been important reasons for disqualifying polygamous marriages 
from family reunifications. Correspondingly, it demonstrates that state and EU policymakers 
believe that firm stance against polygamous marriages will help them achieve these goals. 
In addition to the EU law-making area, the rejection of recognition of polygamous relations 
due to human rights concerns of protection of women has been advocated by the Human Rights 
Council29 and national governments’ initiatives.30 Further, the prohibition of recognition of 
polygamous marriages is on the level of international legal treaties accordingly often connected 
with human rights considerations, e.g. in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, 1993 (CEDAW) and its Article 16.31 Accordingly, the general 
recommendation of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on 
CEDAW encourages states to recognise such effects of polygamous marriage serving the 
economic interests of the women at stake.32  
Researchers concerned with the phenomenon of accommodation of polygamous relations in 
Europe point out that the trend of refusing recognition to foreign polygamous marriages is 
reversing in some European states.33 They present reports on developments in national case 
law and law amendments (German, Belgian, French and Italian), in which the restrictive 
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tendency seems to be replaced with a so-called accommodation approach.34 The 
accommodation approach essentially means that the marriage as such is not considered valid, 
but some of its effects (namely those that serve the economic interests of the wives and 
children) are admitted. This reversal of the trend, however, usually appears in a context 
different from migratory in the strict sense (other cases than family-reunification cases), thus 
the recognition does not appear as an incident question in claiming the right to reside in the 
forum state. When concerns about this development have been addressed in the European 
Parliament, the body has urged member states to assure the illegality of polygamy in order to 
fight violence against women.35 
National parliaments, perhaps in the light of the clear policy direction advocated by the EU 
bodies, but also because polygamous marriages have allegedly occurred in the member states 
more often in the recent years,36 have taken legislative actions to assure a strict approach to the 
marriages by administrative and judicial bodies. Such is the case of the Swedish government, 
which has appointed an inquiry chair to investigate the possibility of making stricter legislation 
on recognition of foreign marriages after a survey by the Swedish Tax Authority discovered 
that 169 people in Sweden live in polygamous marriages.37 This survey led the Swedish 
parliament to order the government to investigate possible legal changes to prevent the 
recognition of foreign polygamous marriages. In its proposal, the government also aims to 
investigate what legal consequences non-recognition can have and if such legislative changes 
would require constitutional amendments.38 
As demonstrated, the approach to polygamous marriages among Western European states 
has remained strongly negative since the mid-1800s.39  In the 19th century, legal scholars and 
courts openly condemned the practice of polygamy as immoral because it contradicted 
Christian values. The presumed supremacy of Western culture immanent to the colonial 
relationship between Western and ‘Oriental’40 culture allowed the judicial bodies and legal 
scholars to regard legal relationships under Islamic Law as inferior to those arranged under 
laws based on Christian values. The substance, as will be shown below, of the argumentation 
against polygamous relationships then in comparison with the present policy argumentation 
against these relationships, has changed. It follows the value re-orientation from Christian to 
secular values. However, the presumption that Western values (or Western interpretations of 
values) are morally superior and able to create fairer relations among the subjects of law still 
prevails. 
 From the law-making sources cited above, it appears that the lawmakers believe that 
restrictive and negative approach to recognition of polygamous marriages in family 
reunification claims has the potential to foster equality between men and women and help 
prevent violence against women. The ideal behind the European family reunification policy on 
polygamous relations has thus moved from believing in the superiority of Christian values to 
believing in the superiority of Western interpretation of human rights values. The legitimacy 
of the aim to enhance rights-based value of protection of women while limiting rights and 
freedoms of spouses in polygamous marriages has been questioned by studies on cultural bias 
behind the concept of human rights41 or even more specifically, cultural bias behind the 
approach of Western courts to polygamy.42 In spite of the change in the substantial 
argumentation against recognition of these marriages, the rejection of recognition of polygamy 
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Not Recognising for the Sake of Equality 
 
The rules on recognition of polygamous marriages in family reunification framework arising 
from the various aforementioned EU and national sources of Migration Law44 stipulate that an 
alien can only bring one spouse to the forum state and other consequent marriages will be not 
recognised. The absolute majority of cases of polygamous marriages brought to European 
countries are composed of one man and two (or more) women, cases of so-called polygyny. 
Therefore, in the aforementioned, legislatively predicted situation, it is in reality the man who 
is married to multiple spouses and must or is allowed to choose one of them to bring along. In 
examining how much the present European rules improve the position of women in 
polygamous marriages (as is the proclaimed objective of these rules), the preliminary question 
to pose is: where does the idea that women in polygamous marriages are in particular need to 
have their positions improved come from, and what are its premises? Under postcolonial 
feminist critical approach, this issue was addressed e.g. by Zainab Naqvi.45   
However, for the purposes of this article, the author would like to accept the premises of the 
EU Reunification Directive rule on non-recognition of polygamy. Therefore, the author will 
disregard whether this policy aim is legitimate and meaningful or prejudiced and culturally 
biased and rather investigate whether the disposition of the rule can establish effective 
promotion of its goal. The legal norm under the EU Reunification Directive says that in the 
event of a polygamous marriage, where the sponsor already has a spouse living with him in 
the territory of a Member State, the Member State concerned shall not authorise the family 
reunification of a further spouse.46  
As mentioned above, the majority of cases appearing before European administrative and 
judicial bodies are cases of polygyny, thus the following critique will be performed with regard 
to the effects of the norm as applied to cases of polygyny. The first point of critique is that the 
norm in its disposition enforces the paradigm that the man has the decisive power over the 
relationship. Since the EU policy presumes that women in polygamous marriages need help to 
improve their position, it is relevant to ask how much regard does the law is pay to the position 
of the remaining wife; whether she was consulted by the man on the decision to move, and 
how much she approved of it. As this decision is very complex and has serious consequences 
for one of the wives, it is possible that this move is not a matter of consensus among all the 
parties concerned. It is also apparent from the ECtHR decision in Bibi v. United Kingdom that 
the wife who remained in the country of origin was also interested in relocating to the UK but 
due to the decision of her husband she could not, at least on family reunification grounds – as 
her (one per marriage) spot in the family reunification was occupied by the wife accompanying 
the man. We may imagine that none of the wives are interested in staying in their country of 
origin when their partner moves to another place, as much as it would be fair to presume this 
in a monogamous spousal relationship. The disposition of the norm thus, in its outlet, grants 
the power of choice solely to the man, in spite of the possible (even probable) disapproval of 
the second wife over the decision of her husband to move away with the second wife. 
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By analysing the structure of the norm, it is possible to imply that it in fact supports the 
reality that the man has all the power over the multi-party relationship and thus partially the 
power over the options for relocation of his wives. The second point of critique following the 
‘man decides’ paradigm, is that the present system does not investigate the situation of the wife 
not chosen by the man to reunify with him, nor her position towards the reunification of the 
other wife, i.e. towards losing the opportunity to reunify. Along with losing the opportunity to 
reunify, the wife faces a turn into partial ineffectiveness of the marriage (in the eyes of the 
forum state). As neither she, nor the children of her and her husband, can in principle use the 
marriage as grounds for relocating (exceptions are possible for the children), she is left in a 
limbo between divorce and ineffective marriage from the perspective of its usability in the 
forum state. Therefore, she cannot enjoy the potential benefits of divorce, nor all the benefits 
of an effective marriage. Additionally, the present rule on family reunification in cases of 
polygamy does not give the wife in the state of origin any procedural opportunity to challenge 
the decision of the husband or the state of affairs after the reunification with another wife has 
been approved. This paradigm, prescribed by the EU Family Reunification Directive, is also 
approved by the ECtHR in terms of compliance with human rights requirements.  
In the cases of recognition of polygamous marriages for the purpose of family reunification, 
one of the parties (whose ability to use the marriage and gain advantage from it will be greatly 
decreased by the recognition of another, simultaneous, marriage) lacks the right to be heard or 
to challenge the decision of her husband and its migratory status consequences for her in the 
forum state. Admittedly, the forum administrative body or court might not know that the 
incoming applicant asking for recognition of one of his marriages might have another 
simultaneous marriage which he fails to mention. However, the third critical point is that the 
present legislative paradigm allows the given administrative body / court to not consider the 
second wife, even if it is aware of the existence of the simultaneous marriage. As the rule 
explicitly gives the power of choice to the husband, his will would be the main point of 
reference for the decision-making body.  
Without underestimating the agency and opportunities of the wife left in the country of origin 
and her options for relocating on other grounds, the above analysis aims to demonstrate what 
consequences does the current rule disqualifying polygamous marriages from family 
reunification in the EU and its member states have for wives in polygamous marriages. While 
this rule is allegedly standing against the practice of polygamy in order to improve the position 
of women, its effects on the power-dynamics in polygamous marriages; and the wives not 
chosen by their men to reunify are rather undermining. As a result of the above analysis, the 
author finds that the present legal approach to recognition of polygamous marriages for the 
purpose of family reunification fails to serve the alleged aim of the legal provisions effectively; 
and is not competent to achieve the proclaimed aim of the policy. In fact, the paradigm that the 
given rule is built on, reproduces the imbalanced power structures allegedly existent in 







The article aimed to introduce the teleological origins of the Migration Law rule of non-
recognition of polygamous marriages for the purpose of family reunification stipulated in the 
regulatory framework of European Union and overtaken by majority of the EU member states. 
The rule states that an alien who is a part of a polygamous marriage can only bring with him 
one spouse to the forum state and further family reunification claims of any additional spouses 
will be dismissed. This rule is, according to the preamble of the Directive, constructed with 
respect to the European human rights requirements as interpreted by the ECtHR. Additionally, 
the preamble of the Directive as well as the guiding materials related to the Directive, claim 
that this rule should act as an instrument of combating forced marriages and protecting women.  
The ECtHR has previously ruled that every state has a right to regulate the number of 
foreigners admitted to reside in the territory of the state as an expression of the state’s 
sovereignty. Additionally, the Court has ruled that national Migration Law rules prohibiting 
the recognition of polygamy, while aimed at the preservation of Christian values, follow a 
legitimate aim with regard to the potential interference with individual human rights caused by 
the application of these rules. Preparatory works and other policy documents show that the 
reason why subjects in polygamous relations should not enjoy the right to have their 
relationship recognised as a whole in the reunification proceeding is that these relationships 
contradict the values of European human rights. Namely, the reasons for the restrictive and 
rejective policy towards recognising polygamous relationships as grounds for family 
reunification are to fight inequality of men and women and to prevent maltreatment of women. 
 The article takes the opportunity to critically analyse how the application of this rule might 
actually affect women in the relationships in question. It employs a critical feminist approach 
in deconstructing the norm to examine the presumptions reflected in the structure of the norm. 
With three points of critique – the point of empowering the husband with decision making 
agency; the point of not allowing the second wife to procedurally challenge the decision of her 
husband and its consequences for her ability to relocate; and the point of the inability of the 
decision-making authority to review the position of the second wife towards the state of affairs, 
the article reaches the conclusion that the present widely spread rule does not improve the 
position of women in polygamous matrimonial relationships, which the policy presupposes as 
unequal to men, but contrarily supports the man-centred power relations, which the policy 
criticises. Therefore, it concludes that the present rule on non-recognition of polygamous 
marriages for the purpose of family reunification is not only incapable of contributing to the 
goal set forth by the lawmakers, but the structure of the norm and its application reproduce the 
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